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THE LAWFUL AND THE JUST:
MORAL IMPLICATIONS OF UNEQUAL
ACCESS TO LEGAL SERVICES
Kathleen Clark*
The summer before I started law school, I remember standing in
Kramerbooks in Washington, D.C., and getting involved in a conversation with a man who was also looking at some of the new books on
display. In typical Washingtonian fashion, he asked me what I did for a
living. I explained that I was about to begin studying law. He was not a
lawyer, but had a great interest in constitutional law and civil rights. He
asked me to keep my focus on "justice," rather than simply studying
"law."'

That conversation came back to me as I was reading Stephen Pepper's paper in preparation for this conference. 2 In the beginning of his
paper, Pepper talks about the shortage of legal services.3 In light of the
conversations held yesterday afternoon, 4 and in particular Anthony
Kronman' s discussion of the legal profession,5 I do not agree that there is
a shortage of legal services in our society. We would all agree that legal
services are distributed in an unequal manner. But I will go further and
assert that there is a maldistribution of legal services: a systematic distribution of legal services that benefits one class and harms others.
Pepper also discusses the difference between that which is lawful
and that which is just.
Rights "as law" mark off an area of individual autonomy; how the
individual uses that autonomy may or may not be morally justifi*

Associate Professor, Washington University School of Law. This essay is based on

comments presented at the Hofstra University School of Law conference on "Legal Ethics: Access to
Justice" in April, 1998. Peter Joy, Ronald Levin and Leila Sadat Wexler provided helpful comments
on an earlier draft.
1. For a very interesting discussion of how law teachers can focus on justice, see Jane Harris
Aiken, Striving to Teach "Justice, Fairness,and Morality," 4 CLIn. L. REv. 1 (1997).
2. Stephen L. Pepper, Access to What? 2 J. INsT. SrtuD. LEG. En. 269 (1999) (hereinafter
Access to What?).
3. Id at 269.
4. Ronald D. Rotunda, Innovative Legal Billing, Ethical Hurdles,and Middle Class Access to
Legal Services, 2 J. INST. S=U. LEG. ET. 221 (1999).
5. Anthony T. Kronman, Professionalism, 2 J. INST. Srtu. LEG. Em. 89 (1999).
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A lawyer who enables a client to achieve or actualize her

rights-to act within that area of6 autonomy-does not necessarily
enable a morally justifiable result.
In these two sentences, Pepper succinctly identifies the central moral
problem for lawyers. When we assist our clients in doing something
they have the legal right to do, we may be helping them to do something
that is unjust.
Pepper's paper for this conference builds on his seminal article from
twelve years ago, in which he argued that lawyers should not be held
morally accountable for helping their clients achieve immoral but lawful
objectives. 7 He now adds'a gloss to that argument, and states that when
a lawyer assists a client in achieving an immoral (or unjust) result, the
lawyer has an obligation to engage in a moral dialogue with the client "to
ensure that the client has indeed chosen to use the law in this [immoral]
way."' He believes that this moral dialogue with a client effectively discharges the lawyer's moral responsibility with respect to her work.
I would not want to underestimate the moral significance-and
practical difficulty-of engaging in such a dialogue. The only times that
I have spoken with a "client" this way occurred when I was clerking for a
judge. When I worked for a member of Congress and dealt with morally
salient subjects (such as the death penalty), I engaged in this kind of
moral discourse with my colleagues, but not with my client.9 Certainly,
a lawyer who does engage the client in this moral dialogue shows respect
for the client as a moral being, rather than simply making assumptions
about the client's value system.
But I believe that such a conversation does not immunize the lawyer
from moral culpability for assisting a client in achieving immoral ends.
In this way, I take issue not so much with the assertions that Professor
Pepper makes in his paper for this conference, but in his assumptions,
which are based on the arguments that he developed in his earlier work.
There, Pepper articulated perhaps the strongest argument for insulating
lawyers from moral responsibility for assisting clients achieve immoral
goals, noting that in our "highly legalized" society, individuals need the
6. Access to What?, supra note 2, at 274. For other discussions of the morality of lawyers'
role, see William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988);
Robert P. Lawry, The CentralMoral Tradition of Lawyering, 19 HoFs'RA L. REV. 311 (1990).
7. Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role, 1986 AM. B. FouND. RES. J. 613
(hereinafter The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role).
8. Access to What?, supra note 2, at 276 (emphasis in original).
9. Kathleen Clark, The Ethics of Representing Elected Representatives, 61 L. & CoNT. PRoB.
31, 42 (1998).
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assistance of lawyers to accomplish their goals."t He argued that it
would be improper for lawyers to filter their professional work through
their own moral beliefs because such filtering would interfere with clients' autonomy.
But Pepper also argued-unpersuasively, I believe-that this refusal to engage in moral filtering also promotes equality of access to law. t1
This is a difficult claim to make, especially in light of the fact that financial resources and legal services are not distributed equally throughout
society. Pepper acknowledged this underlying inequality, but argued that
it is not significant because "[w]e live in a primarily market system, not a
primarily socialist system .... Lawyers cannot magically socialize the
economy [f]or legal services. '"12 He noted that other commodities, such
as groceries and housing, are also distributed unequally, and remarked
that "there is much less disquiet over the moral' 3role of the grocer [and]
housing contractor . than that of the lawyer."'
What Pepper did not seem to understand is that there is a good reason for this difference in attitude. Lawyers are in a different position
than grocers and housing contractors. A grocer's decision to sell bread
to one person does not aggravate another person's hunger. A housing
contractor's decision to build a home for one person does not cause
another person's homelessness. But a lawyer's decision to intervene in a
legal matter on behalf of one party may actually make the situation worse
for the parties who cannot afford legal services.' 4 This is most obviously
true in a legal dispute where an unrepresented party will be disadvantaged if the opposing party is represented by a lawyer. t5 It is also true
where the lawyer is assisting the client in planning a transaction, and
persons who may be affected by the transaction are not represented or
even notified. Such is often the case with lawyer-lobbyists who obtain
favorable tax or other regulatory treatment for their clients.

10. The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role, supra note 7, at 617 ("The lawyer is the means to
first-class citizenship, to meaningful autonomy, for the client.").
11. Id. at 618 (In addition to autonomy, another "significant value supporting the first-class
citizenship model is that of equality... For access to the law to be filtered unequally through the
disparate moral views of each individual's lawyer does not appear to be justifiable.")
12. Id. at 618-19.
13. Id. at 619.
14. Access to What?, supra note 2, at 272 (comparing a lawyer to "a military tank-a tool of
destruction and harm to persons the client chose to aim it at.").
15. In such situations, the legal profession does impose the minimal obligation on a lawyer
"not [to] state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested." AMERicAN BAR AssocIATION, MODEL
Ruas OF PROFESSIONAL Comucr, Rule 4.3 (Dealing with Unrepresented Person).
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Pepper argued that "it does not make sense to compound that inequality with another." 6 Here he seemed to presume that any moral filtering by lawyers will tend to accentuate rather than diminish that
inequality. 7 But I believe it is lawyers' failure to filter that accentuates
inequality. While there is a natural tendency for lawyers to identify with
and favor their clients' interests, such a tendency could be countered by a
professional requirement to think through the effect of one's work on
those not represented. 8
Pepper was right in his claim that lawyers' refusal to engage in
moral filtering promotes autonomy, but wrong in his claim that it also
promotes equality. There is a tradeoff between autonomy and equality.
People who value client autonomy over equality will conclude, like Pepper, that lawyers' non-filtering or "amoral" role is appropriate.
In light of the systemic maldistribution of legal services, I believe
that lawyers cannot simply hand off all moral responsibility to their clients. Because of the unequal access to legal services, and because
laywers can assist clients to accomplish unjust but legal ends, I believe
that lawyers have a moral obligation
either

to systematically provide legal services to those who
would otherwise be unrepresented or underrepresented;

or

to systematically consider the impact of their work on
the unrepresented or the underrepresented.

As a profession, we have failed to take the first option. Therefore, as
individuals, we have an obligation to take the second option. What I am
suggesting is that we incorporate into our notion of professionalism some
kind of "preferential option" for the unrepresented and the underrepresented. 9
16. The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role, supra note 7, at 619.
17. Id. at 620 ("To suggest that transforming the amoral facilitator role of the lawyer into the
judge/facilitator role.., would compound inequality upon inequality - first the inequality of access
to a lawyer, then the inequality of what law that particular lawyer will allow the client access to.").
18. Cf. ABA Model Rule 3.3 (requiring a lawyer in an ex parte proceeding to provide all
relevant facts and law - not just that favoring her client).
19. It is beyond the scope of this brief comment to develop fully the contours of such a moral
obligation. But see David Fagelson, Rights and Duties: The Ethical Obligation to Serve the Poor,
17 L. & INEQUAL. 171 (1999); Karen A. Lash, Pauline Gee, & Laurie Zelon, Equal Access to Civil
Justice: Pursuing Solutions Beyond the Legal Profession, 17 YALE L. & POL. REv. 489 (1998). For
some religious writing about the moral obligation to consider the interests of those without power,
see POPE Jom PAUL 11, CErEsIMus ANrus T 58 (1991) ("It is... necessary that in evaluating the
consequences of their decisions, [international] agencies always give sufficient consideration to
peoples and countries which have little weight in the international market, but which are burdened
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Lawyers tend to ignore the distinction between what the law entitles
our clients to do and what justice requires our clients to do. Stephen
Pepper challenges lawyers to engage in a moral discourse with clients
about the choices that the clients make, and argues that such a discourse
discharges a lawyer's moral responsibility for the client's action. I
believe that lawyers must go further, and accept moral responsibility for
the impact of our work on others who do not have equal access to legal
services.

by the most acute and desperate needs ....."); NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS,
ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL: A PASTORAL MESSAGE
16 (1986) ("As followers of Christ, we are
challenged to make a fundamental 'option for the poor' - to speak for the voiceless, to defend the
defenseless, to assess life styles, policies, and social institutions in terms of their impact on the
poor.").

